Leadership games with convex strategy sets
WebLet the set of their partial strategy profiles (with k strategies) be Y , so that X × Y is the set of full strategy profiles. The leadership game is the extensive game where the leader chooses x in X , the followers are informed about x and choose simultaneously their strategies as f (x) in Y , and all players receive their payoffs as given by the strategy … WebOur learning dynamics are based on an instantiation of optimistic follow-the-regularized-leader over an appropriately lifted space using a self-concordant regularizer that is peculiarly not a barrier for the feasible region.
Leadership games with convex strategy sets
Did you know?
Web30 jun. 2010 · A basic model of commitment is to convert a two-player game in strategic form to a “leadership game” with the same payoffs, where one player, the leader, … Webstrategic form to a “leadership game” with the same payoffs, where one player, the leader, commits to a strategy, to which the second player always chooses a best reply. This …
Web18 feb. 2010 · Game Theory: Lecture 5 Example Introduction In this lecture, we study the question of existence of a Nash equilibrium in both games with finite and infinite pure strategy spaces. We start with an example, pricing-congestion game, where players have infinitely many pure strategies. We consider two instances of this game, one of which … WebA basic model of commitment is to convert a two-player game in strategic form to a leadership game with the same payoffs, where one player, the leader, commits to a …
WebCreate a new game with N players, strategy spaces Δ(S 1), ... is the set of mixed strategies for player i that maximize the expected ... -Also, X is convex: If p, p’ are in X, then so is any point on the line segment between them. The existence theorem: proof WebA basic model of commitment is to convert a two-player game in strategic form to a “leadership game” with the same payoffs, where one player, the leader, commits to a …
Web27 feb. 2024 · We address Stackelberg games with a single leader and multiple followers.Following [], we study settings in which, after observing the leader’s commitment, the followers play a Nash equilibrium in the resulting game.We refer to this solution as Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium.We focus on the case in which the followers are restricted …
Webuncoupled learning algorithm with O(logT) per-player regret in general convex games, that is, games with concave utility functions supported on arbitrary convex and compact strategy sets. Our learning dynamics are based on an instantiation of optimistic follow-the-regularized-leader over an appropriately lifted space using a civil rights movement australiaWebWe define a leadership game as follows (for details see Section 2). Consider a game of k +1playersinstrategicform. Declare one player as leader andlethisstrategysetbeX. The remaining k players are called followers. Let the set of their partial strategy profiles (with k strategies) be Y, so that X ×Y is the set of full strategy profiles. The ... do vegans eat tofuWeb24 okt. 2014 · This paper studies such leadership games for games with convex strategy sets. We apply them to mixed extensions of finite games, which we analyze completely, … civil rights movement and the black churchWeb28 nov. 2024 · D. Koller, N. Megiddo, and B. von Stengel (1994), Fast algorithms for finding randomized strategies in game trees. Proceedings of the 26th ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing , 750-759. J. Esparza and B. von Stengel (1994), The asynchronous committee meeting problem . do vegans have better health outcomesWeb1 jul. 2010 · Leadership games with convex strategy sets @article{Stengel2010LeadershipGW, title={Leadership games with convex strategy … dove friendshipWeb31 okt. 2024 · Keywords: No-regret learning, optimism, extensive-form games, convex games. TL;DR: We establish the first near-optimal learning dynamics for games with concave utilities and general convex strategy sets. Abstract: A recent line of work has established uncoupled learning dynamics such that, when employed by all players in a … civil rights movement bombingWebMin-max optimization problems (i.e., min-max games) have been attracting a great deal of attention because of their applicability to a wide range of machine learning problems. Although significant progress has been made recently, the literature to date has focused on games with independent strategy sets; little is known about civil rights movement bloody sunday